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This paper analyses the impact of public equity schemes on venture 
capitalist’s incentives to finance start-up enterprises and to support the 
management teams. In a double-sided moral hazard model, it is shown that 
experienced venture capitalists, who have already financed start-up 
enterprises, reduce their intensity of management support under public 
equity schemes. However, public equity offers inexperienced venture 
capitalists, who have not yet financed start-up enterprises because of insuf-
ficient experience, incentives to enter the venture capital market so that 
they can start to accumulate experience. 
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1 Introduction 
Several European governments have started to support venture capital 
investments in young high-technology enterprises (OECD 1997, Lessat et 
al. 1999). There are two main reasons for supporting these enterprises via 
venture capital. First, these enterprises seem to have a significant impact on 
productivity and employment growth. Second, venture capitalists take on 
more functions and add more valuable resources in the enterprises than 
traditional intermediaries do. Brav and Gompers (1997) find some evidence 
that venture-capital-backed enterprises indeed outperform non-venture-
capital-backed ones even after the initial public offering. Moreover, the 
empirical analysis by Kortum and Lerner (2000) shows that venture 
capitalists affect the patenting behaviour of the enterprises they finance. 
Venture-capital-backed enterprises patent significantly more than other 
comparable enterprises. 
This paper analyses the impact of public equity schemes on venture capi-
talists’ incentives to finance young high-technology enterprises. Under 
public equity schemes, publicly supported co-investors offer capital to 
high-technology start-ups if private venture capitalists also make an invest-
ment. Examples for this kind of publicly supported co-investors are the 
German Technologie-Beteiligungs-Gesellschaft (tbg, technology partici-
pation company) and the French Banque du Développement des Petits et 
Moyennes Entreprises (BDPME, Bank to Develop Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises). 
When analysing the impact of public equity on venture capitalists’ incen-
tives to finance young high-technology enterprises, venture capitalists’ 
active involvement in the enterprises must be taken into account. Public 
equity can influence the intensity of venture capitalists’ involvement in the 
enterprises because public equity increases the expected return of venture 
capitalists’ investments (otherwise the venture capitalists would not accept 
public equity). This increase in expected returns reduces the venture capi-
talists’ incentives to carefully monitor, select and support the enterprises.  
The profit of the enterprise does not solely depend on venture capitalist’s 
involvement but also on the entrepreneur’s behaviour who has the innova-
tive idea and the technological knowledge which is needed to realize the 
innovative idea. This leads to a double-sided moral hazard problem – 2 – 
between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur (Schmidt 1999, 
Lülfelsmann 2000). When a double-sided moral hazard problem exists, 
both contracting parties have to provide the opposite party with sufficient 
incentives to do something after the contract has been signed. For example, 
the entrepreneur needs incentives to use her technological expertise in the 
development of the enterprise, while the venture capitalist needs incentives 
to pledge his contacts to customers and suppliers as well as his specific 
technological experience to the enterprise he has chosen to finance. 
In addition to venture capitalists’ active involvement, the heterogeneity of 
venture capitalists with respect to their experience must be taken into 
account when analysing the impact of public equity on venture capitalists’ 
incentives to finance high-technology start-ups. Considering the heteroge-
neity is important because venture capitalists whose levels of experience 
differ may react differently to public equity. Venture capitalists have to 
gain stage- and technology-specific experience to add valuable resources to 
the enterprises and to handle the high investment risks associated with 
high-technology start-ups. Gaining experience is time consuming because it 
is a learning-by-doing procedure.  
The impact of public policies on venture capital activity has been 
investigated in the recent literature. Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2001) analyse 
how subsidies to equipment investment affect total venture capital 
investments. They show that this subsidy reduces venture capitalists’ 
incentives to support the management and that it causes an inefficient 
increase in total investments. This is because venture capitalists lower their 
support per start-up so that they can finance and support more start-ups, 
while the number of successfully started enterprises remains unchanged. 
But in this partial equilibrium model, venture capitalists are homogenous, 
and the role of experience as well as accumulation of experience is not 
considered. Moreover, the optimal number of start-ups is financed 
independent of the government’s subsidy. Thus, the subsidy causes a 
welfare loss. 
This paper shows that public equity does not only cause an ineffi-
ciency but that it can also offer a positive stimulus under certain con-
ditions. Under public equity, experienced venture capitalists, who have 
already gained sufficient experience, have incentives to make use of the 
public equity and then to reduce their management support in the enter-– 3 – 
prises, which reduces the surplus of the enterprises. But under public equity 
inexperienced venture capitalists have incentives to finance young high-
technology enterprises for the first time so that these venture capitalists 
may start to accumulate stage- and technology-specific experience. Thus, 
the welfare effects of public equity depend on whether venture capitalists 
have already gained the experience that is needed to finance young high-
technology enterprises. 
This analysis is to some extent similar to that in Schertler (2000), in 
which the implications of public loans with a guarantee component are 
analysed. However, the mechanisms embedded in public loan and public 
equity schemes differ with respect to incentive effects. A public loan 
scheme reduces the venture capitalist’s incentives to add value-increasing 
management support since the government partly covers venture capital-
ist’s realized losses. A public equity scheme, however, does not only 
change venture capitalist’s incentives but also the incentives of the entre-
preneur to exert effort in the development of the new prototype since under 
public equity a third party, the publicly supported co-investor, participates 
in the enterprise’s profits as well. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the basic model for the 
analysis is introduced. Section 3 identifies the inefficiency caused by an 
equity-based scheme, and scrutinizes the positive stimulus of a public 
equity scheme. Section 4 concludes. 
2  The basic model 
Although I explicitly consider only a single venture capitalist in the model, 
there are in fact many venture capitalists in the market who differ with 
respect to their experience  . Venture capitalists who financed a multitude 
of high-technology start-ups in the past have more experience than venture 
capitalists who have financed only some start-up enterprises. If the 
entrepreneur meets a venture capitalist without sufficient experience, she 
may look for another venture capitalist who has sufficient experience to 
make the investment profitable. Therefore, two important effects of public 
equity can be investigated. How does public equity affect the management 
support exerted by venture capitalists who have sufficient experience to 
make high-risk start-up investments profitable? And how does public 
H– 4 – 
equity affect the investment decision of venture capitalists who have not 
yet built up sufficient experience to make high-risk start-ups profitable? 
An entrepreneur (  has an innovative product idea, but she lacks the 
necessary financial means to finance the start-up investment   herself 
and the experience necessary to manage the enterprise in an efficient man-
ner. Therefore, she needs funding by a venture capitalist ( , who offers 
profit-increasing management support. Before the start-up investment is 
made, the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur sign a contract in which 
the revenue allocation   is specified. The venture capitalist receives 
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Figure 1:  Time Structure of the Model 
 
Time 
Contract is signed 
Investment I is 
made 
Effort of the 
entrepreneur and 
venture capitalist 




the state of the 
 
 
After the capital has been invested, both contracting parties exert their 
efforts, without observing the effort amount of the respective complemen-
tary party. Neither the specific effort of the entrepreneur nor the venture 
capitalist’s effort can be contracted upon. While none of the contracting 
parties can affect the probability of the product innovation’s technical 
success, both can affect the product innovation’s expected revenue. In 
addition to the effort invested by the two parties, nature determines the 
revenue of the enterprise that can take two states. In the state with low 
performance l, reached with probability    , the venture capi-
talist’s pay-off does not cover the investment costs independent of the 
effort invested by the contracting parties. While in the state with high per-
formance h, reached with probability    , the enterprise’s 
revenue exceeds the effort and investment costs. The sum of the probabili-
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The expected revenue  R of the enterprise is given by 
, with 1,   , and 
ˆ
() ω βV E Ap p R h l




as a shift parameter ensuring that the revenue of the enterprise is larger in 
the good state of the project than in the low performance state.1 In order to 
ensure a shift parameter larger than one, the start-up investment must also 
be larger than one  .   denotes the entrepreneur’s effort, and V  is the 
venture capitalist’s management support. The management support offered 
by the venture capitalist is a function of his time spent in the enterprise 
and his experience  ,  , with  . The venture 
capitalist has gained his experience by being involved in young high-
technology enterprises he financed in the past. Therefore, his experience is 
exogenously given in the short-run; the venture capitalist maximizes his 
expected pay-off by choosing his time for doing management support. 
Inserting the venture capitalist’s management support and the shift 
parameter   into the expected revenue function of the enterprise, and 
defining   and δ= , the expected revenue is given by 
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The venture capitalist receives a share α  of the enterprise’s expected reve-
nue. He has to carry the costs of the start-up investment  , since the entre-
preneur has no funds of her own. Furthermore, he takes the costs for doing 
management support into account (the value of his outside option). It is 
assumed that he cannot offer his time without his experience. The higher 
his time V , or the higher his experience  , the higher the value of his out-
side option is, which is given by  . For simplicity, the interest rate is set 
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1  The construction of the shift parameter ensures that high-risk start-up enterprises 
have a higher shift parameter than low-risk ones. A high-risk start-up enterprise has 
therefore ceteris paribus a higher pay-off in the good state of the project. Let   be 
the probability to reach the low performance state of enterprise   that is relatively 
low compared to the probability   of the enterprise    . Then the 
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 so that  . The last inequality 
is fulfilled since  . 
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l −− > 10– 6 – 
The entrepreneur receives the share   of the enterprise’s expected 
revenue. Since she has to carry only her effort costs, her expected pay-off 
function is given by: 
( α − 1 )
[2]   .  () E H V IE U EN − − = λ δ β α 1 ˆ
This game with simultaneous move between the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur has two Nash equilibriums. In one of these, the efforts by the 
contracting parties are zero, and this is not of economic interest. Since the 
expected pay-offs and the realized pay-offs in all states of the project are 
always zero, nobody would provide venture capital. However, there exists 
another Nash equilibrium in which the efforts of contracting parties are 
positive if the venture capitalist has sufficient experience to make the 
investment profitable. Otherwise, the venture capitalist would not finance 
the start-up investment.  
Differentiating the expected pay-off functions of the entrepreneur [2] and 
of the venture capitalist [1] with respect to their effort levels   and V  and 
solving this equation system, gives the optimal effort levels as a function of 
the revenue allocation () : 
E
α α, 1−
[3]   () [ ] δ β δ λ δ δ δ δ δ β α α − − − − − − = 1
1
1 1 * 1 IH E         and 
[4]   () [ ] δ β λ β β β β β δ β α α − − − + − − − = 1
1
1 1 1 * 1 IH V . 
For any revenue allocation   fulfilling 0 , the effort levels of 
the contracting parties are positive if the venture capitalist funds the start-
up investment. The entrepreneur’s effort increases with the venture capi-
talist’s experience, since λ> , while the time that the venture capitalist 
spends in the enterprise decreases with his experience, since 
 because of 1 . Therefore, venture capitalists 
with long experience in financing start-up investments need less time to 
control and support the management team compared to relatively 
inexperienced venture capitalists. 
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Inserting the optimal effort levels of the entrepreneur [3] and of the venture 
capitalist [4] in the expected pay-off functions [1] and [2] gives the 
expected pay-offs of the contracting parties as a function of the revenue 
allocation   and of the venture capitalist’s experience  :  ( α α, 1− H– 7 – 
[5]   () [ ] ( β δ β α α δ β δ λ δ β δ δ − − = − − − − 1 1 ˆ 1
1
1 IH U EN )         and 
[6]   () [ ] () I IH UVC − − − = − − − − δ δ β α α δ β δ λ δ β β β 1 1 ˆ 1
1
1 . 
For any revenue allocation (  fulfilling  , the entrepreneur 
has a positive expected pay-off, while the venture capitalist’s expected pay-
off depends on the amount of the start-up investment   and on his 
experience  . As noted above, in the state of the project with low 
performance l, the venture capitalist realizes a negative pay-off,2 while in 
the state of the project with high performance h, he may receive a positive 
pay-off depending on his experience and on the revenue allocation. 
Certainly, if his experience is insufficient he receives a negative pay-off 
even in the high performance state of the project, and therefore, he does not 
finance the start-up investment of the enterprise. 
)
)
α α, 1− 1 0 < <α
I
H
In order to solve the model, one does not need an explicit assumption on 
the bargaining power of the contracting parties. However, to determine the 
sufficient level of experience that a venture capitalist requires to finance a 
high-risk investment in a profitable way, the venture capitalist’s preferred 
revenue allocation must be specified. The venture capitalist’s expected pay-
off reaches its maximum at α , which ensures that the entrepre-
neur’s expected pay-off is positive. 
β − =1
Let me now discuss under which conditions the venture capitalist finances 
the start-up investment. He is willing to finance a high-risk investment only 
if his expected pay-off [6], with his preferred (  revenue 
allocation, is non-negative. Thus his experience  , which he has gained in 
































                                                 
2  The venture capitalist’s pay-off in the low performance state of the project is lower 
than zero when the start-up investment is sufficiently large: I >1 δ  (for a detailed 
discussion see Schertler (2000)). – 8 – 
All venture capitalists who have less experience than this minimum level 
H  have no incentive to finance start-up enterprises, since their expected 
pay-offs are always negative.  
All venture capitalists who have at least this experience are capable of 
financing start-up investments, since their expected pay-offs are non-nega-
tive. Venture capitalists whose experience is equal to the minimum level 
only finance start-up investments if the revenue allocation preferred by 
them   is contractually specified, while venture capitalists whose 
experience exceeds this sufficient level may also accept equity stakes 
which are lower than their preferred stakes   
( β α− =1 )
() β α− <1.
3  The impact of public equity on venture capitalists’ 
investment incentives 
In this section, I show that a public equity scheme have two effects on 
venture capitalist’s investment incentives. First, public equity lowers ven-
ture capitalist’s effort if the venture capitalist has already gained sufficient 
experience to finance young high-technology enterprises. Second, public 
equity reduces the minimum level of venture capitalist’s experience at least 
required to make high-risk start-up investments profitable. The first effect 
can lower the efficiency of venture capital finance because public equity 
increases the venture capitalist’s expected pay-off but lowers the surplus of 
the enterprise. The second effect may stimulate the venture capitalists’ 
experience accumulation and can have therefore a positive effect on wel-
fare in the long-run.  
3.1  Welfare loss in the case of experienced venture capitalists 
Public equity changes the venture capitalist’s expected pay-off [1] since the 
venture capitalist and the public co-investor simultaneously invest capital 
into the start-up enterprise. The venture capitalist has to carry only a part of 
the investment risk since the co-investor carries the risk of his investment 
himself. In exchange for his investment, the co-investor participates in the 
enterprise’s profit in the good state of the project, while in the low 
performance state of the project, the revenue of the enterprise is distributed 
only among the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. Suppose that under 
the public equity scheme, the co-investor takes on a share   of the start-up 
investment   in exchange for a profit share 0 . Then, the 
µ
≤ I 1 1− ≤κ– 9 – 
expected pay-off function of the venture capitalist [1] under the equity 
scheme is given by: 
[8]   ,  () () ( I HV H V E p I p U l l
VC
ES µ κ α λ δ β − − − − + = 1 ˆ )
The revenue allocation between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur 
is not affected by taking the public equity scheme into account because the 
revenue distributed among the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist is re-
defined by using the parameter κ  instead of introducing a second specifica-
tion of the revenue allocation. Since the co-investor receives a share of the 
profit realized in the good state of the project, the entrepreneur’s expected 
pay-off [2] changes as well: 
[9]    .  () ( ) () E H V E p I p U l l
EN
ES − − + − = λ δ β κ α 1 ˆ
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Figure 2 shows the reaction curves of the two contracting parties that can 
be used to explain the impact of public equity. The reaction curve of the 
venture capitalist depicts the venture capitalist’s effort level as a function of 
the entrepreneur’s effort levels. Under a public equity scheme, the venture 
capitalist with a particular experience is less willing to support the – 10 – 
entrepreneur at all her effort levels. Thus, the venture capitalist’s reaction 
curve with respect to the entrepreneur’s effort shifts inwards. Moreover, the 
entrepreneur is also less willing to exert effort in the development of the 
innovative product since she has to share the enterprise’s pay-off with a 
third party. Therefore, the entrepreneur’s reaction curve also shifts inwards. 
In the new equilibrium ( ) * * , ES ES E V , both contracting parties’ effort is lower 
compared to the situation without public equity ( ) * *, E V . 
In analytical terms, the optimal effort levels of the contracting parties under 
the public equity scheme are given by: 
[10]  () ( ) () [] δ β δ λ δ δ δ δ κ δ β α α − − − − − − + − = 1
1
1 1 * 1 H p I p E l l ES       and 
[11]  () ( ) () [] δ β λ β β β β β κ δ β α α − − − + − − − + − = 1
1
1 1 1 * 1 H p I p V l l ES . 
 
Inserting the optimal effort levels [10] and [11] into the expected pay-off 
functions of the venture capitalist [8] and the entrepreneur [9] gives the 
expected pay-offs under the equity scheme as a function of the revenue 
allocation: 
[12]  () ( ) () [] () ( I H p I p U l l
VC
ES µ δ κ δ β α α δ β δ λ δ β β β − − − − + − = − − − − 1 1 1 ˆ 1
1
1 )  
  and 
[13]  () ( ) () [] () β κ δ β α α δ β δ λ δ β δ δ − − + − = − − − − 1 1 ˆ 1
1
1 H p I p U l l
EN
ES . 
Comparing venture capitalist’s expected pay-offs with [12] and without 
public equity [6] shows that a critical level of experience exists above 
which the venture capitalist does not prefer a publicly supported co-
investment, since his expected pay-off is lower with than without public 
equity. This level is given by: – 11 – 
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H , 
with  H HES >  if  () () ( ) 0 1 1 1 > − − + − − −δ β µ κ κ I pl . Since the first term is 
always larger than zero, I have to ensure only that:  () ( ) 0 1 1 > − − − −δ β µ κ I . 
Thus, venture capitalists whose experience exceeds the sufficient level H
()δ β µ − − 1
 
only make use of the public equity scheme if κ . The reason 
for this is that venture capitalists have no incentive to make use of public 
equity when the co-investor invests only a small share of the start-up 
investment and demands large profit participation. Moreover, since the 
venture capitalist has to carry effort costs himself, he is not willing to 
exchange one per cent of the investment amount against one per cent of 
profits. Therefore, public equity has an impact on the behaviour of 
experienced venture capitalists only if the co-investor’s profit participation 
is low compared with his investment share. 
− > 1







pay-off  pay-off without public equity 
pay-off with public 
equity 
ES H   H   ES H
 – 12 – 
Figure  3 shows the effects of public equity on the venture capitalist’s 
expected pay-off. Venture capitalists whose experience is above the suffi-
cient level H  and below the critical level of experience  ES H  have incen-
tives to use public equity. Venture capitalists whose experience is above the 
critical level have no incentives to use public equity because their expected 
pay-off is higher without public equity than with public equity. 
The publicly supported co-investor expects a monetary loss in the low 
performance state of the project, and in the good state he participates in 
profits instead of receiving a re-payment of the capital invested. His 
expected pay-off is given by: 





























1 ˆ U . 
The co-investor’s expected pay-off is negative if his profit participation is 
zero (the remaining profit share distributed among the venture capitalist 
and the entrepreneur is one). The higher the co-investor’s profit participa-
tion (the lower the remaining profit share) is, the lower the venture capi-
talist’s and the entrepreneur’s effort incentives, and the revenue of the 
enterprise. The higher the venture capitalist’s experience is, the higher the 
revenue of the enterprise and the co-investor’s pay-off. But the pay-off of 
the co-investor is never positive, since venture capitalists whose experience 
makes the co-investor’s pay-off positive prefer financing young high-
technology enterprises without public equity. 
The change in the total surplus of the enterprise is given by the sum of the 
difference in the venture capitalist’s expected pay-offs with [12] and with-
out public equity [6], the difference in the entrepreneur’s expected pay-offs 
with [13] and without public equity [5], and the co-investor’s expected cost 
[15]. Using venture capitalist’s preferred revenue allocation, it follows: 
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with  () [] δ β δ λ δ β β δ β β − − − − − = 1
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2 1 1 : H C  
Public equity never increases the surplus of the enterprise for the parame-
ters specified (proof see appendix). The venture capitalist’s expected pay-
off is higher with than without public equity, since otherwise a venture 
capitalist would not use the public equity. The opposite is true for the 
entrepreneur’s expected pay-off because both contracting parties reduce 
their effort levels under the public equity scheme. Therefore, public equity 
causes an inefficiency when venture capitalist’s experience is between the 
minimum level H  and the critical level  ES H . 
Since equation [16] is never positive, the start-up investment should never 
be financed by more than one investor because co-investments (such as 
public equity) reduce the surplus of the enterprise. This result is similar to 
the findings by Repullo and Suarez (1999), who emphasize the role of 
incentive problems in a model focusing on a stage-financed enterprise. 
They show that buying back the investor’s shares of the first capital infu-
sion, or financing the first as well as the second capital infusion by a single 
venture capitalist, increases the incentives to exert value-increasing effort. 
At first glance, this result seems to contradict the empirically observed 
syndication of venture capital investments, i.e. the financing of an enter-
prise by several venture capitalists. But the model used here and the model 
by Repullo and Suarez (1999) do not consider all characteristics of the 
venture capital relationships that might explain the syndication of invest-
ments. The continuation decision belongs to these characteristics. In the 
model by Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), a venture capitalist gets inside 
information on the enterprise by financing the first stage of capital infusion. 
They show that the continuation decision of the lead venture capitalist (who 
financed the first capital infusion) is optimal only if the venture capitalist’s 
share in expected pay-offs is equal to his original investment share. Further – 14 – 
capital infusions must be syndicated in order to ensure a constant share on 
expected pay-offs. 
A public equity scheme reduces welfare if the venture capital market is in 
its mature stage in which venture capitalists have already gained sufficient 
experience because experienced venture capitalists reduce their effort that 
results in a lower surplus of the enterprise. This result is in line with the 
model result by Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2001). As they have shown in a 
partial equilibrium model, public subsidies increase the venture 
capital investment volume since more enterprises are financed. The 
reason for this is that public subsidies reduce venture capitalists’ in-
centives for supporting the entrepreneurs so that they increase the 
number of high-technology enterprises financed until their time con-
straint for management support is binding again. The number of high-
technology enterprises without public subsidies is first-best efficient 
because there is no market distortion. Therefore, public subsidies 
increase the number of unsuccessfully financed high-technology enter-
prises as well. 
3.2  Welfare gain in the case of inexperienced venture capitalists 
Public equity reduces the sufficient minimum level of venture capitalists’ 
experience required to make high-risk start-up investments profitable. 
Without public equity, inexperienced venture capitalists, whose experience 
is below the sufficient level H , have no incentive to finance high-risk 
investments since their expected pay-off is negative (Figure 3 above). 
Under public equity, however, relatively inexperienced venture capitalists, 
whose experience is lower than the minimum level H  and above the 
minimum level of experience under public equity  ES H , get incentives to 
enter the market for high-risk investments. Therefore, if the supply of 
experienced venture capitalists is insufficient, which can be the case in the 
early stage of a venture capital market, public equity can be welfare 
improving. 
Since the revenue allocation preferred by the venture capitalist is not 
affected by public equity, the venture capitalist’s preferred revenue 
allocation α  can be used and inserted in the expected pay-off of the 
venture capitalist under public equity [12] in order to determine the 
minimum level of experience under public equity: 
β − =1– 15 – 
[17]  ()
()
() ( ) () []
δ λ
δ β























l l ES p I p
I
H . 
The minimum level of experience with public equity [17] exceeds the 
minimum level of experience [7] if the following inequality is fulfilled:  
() () 0 1 1 1 > − − + − − − I I pl
δ β µ κ κ ,  
which is identical to the inequality which ensures that the critical level of 
experience exceeds the sufficient level. Setting the probability of reaching 
the project’s low performance state equal to zero results in: 
() ( ) 0 1 1 > − − − −δ β µ κ I
>
. Thus, under public equity, inexperienced venture 
capitalists, who have not yet gained the experience to finance high-
technology start-ups, have incentives to enter the market and to finance 
these enterprises if κ . By financing these enterprises, they 
may start to gain stage- and technology-specific experience necessary to 
successfully select, monitor, and support these enterprises.  
()δ β µ − − − 1 1
Inexperienced venture capitalists react differently to public equity than 
experienced venture capitalists do. If the publicly supported co-investor 
offers public equity at favourable conditions, i.e. if κ  
experienced venture capitalists use the public equity and reduce their man-
agement support in the enterprises. The reduction of management support 
lowers the surplus of the enterprise. Moreover, if the condition is fulfilled, 
public equity stimulates relatively inexperienced venture capitalists to enter 
the market for high-technology investments. 
()δ β µ − − − > 1 1,
Under which condition does public equity increase welfare? Public equity 
does increase welfare only if it stimulates the gaining of experience in an 
efficient manner. Thus, it can only increase welfare if venture capitalists 
have only started to gain experience to finance high-risk investments in a 
profitable way and if the gaining of experience is hampered significantly, 
i.e., if the growth rate of experience is below the efficient one.3 Therefore, 
                                                 
3  Venture capitalists are capable of gaining only a specific amount of experience. They 
do not gain the double amount of experience if they finance the double number of 
enterprises under government subsidies.  – 16 – 
public equity can be important only in the early stage of venture capital 
markets in which venture capitalists are comparatively inexperienced. In 
this stage, venture capital activity is low compared with the mature stage of 
this market. 
The gaining of experience can be hampered if venture capitalists have not 
yet built reputation as specialists and active intermediaries. Venture capi-
talists need reputation in order to raise funds from passive investors. They 
build up this reputation by successfully exiting from some of their invest-
ments (which they have probably financed with their own financial means) 
via an initial public offering or a trade sale to an informed outside investor, 
such as an established firm in the industry. 
Moreover, the gaining of experience can be hampered by a rate of unsuc-
cessful venture-capital-backed enterprises that is above the long-term 
failure rate. The low level of venture capitalists’ experience in the early 
stage of the venture capital market can certainly cause extraordinary high 
failure rates. Moreover, suppose that the probability to fail is exogenously 
given. Then the probability to realize a higher failure rate in the early stage 
of the venture capital market is positive for a particular venture capitalist 
because of the small number of young high-technology enterprises in the 
venture capitalist’s portfolio in comparison to the number of enterprises in 
the portfolio in the mature stage. In any case, a failure rate of venture-
capital-backed enterprises that exceeds the long-term failure rate reduces 
venture capital activity and, thus, reduces the gaining of experience. 
However, public equity schemes will be wasting taxpayer’s money if the 
innovation climate for a liquid venture capital market is poor. Whether an 
economy has innovation climate for a liquid venture capital market depends 
on several determinants which are certainly not of a static nature and which 
are to some extent interdependent. For example, the innovation climate for 
a liquid venture capital market depends on the innovation system: The 
more in-house research and development activities are, the less likely the 
development of a venture capital market is. However, the less developed 
financial markets are, the more likely in-house research and development 
activities are. Second, the innovative climate depends on the number of 
individuals generating ideas. This number is in turn affected by the design 
of the university system. For example, the more creativity and – 17 – 
individualism a university system initiates, the higher the number of indi-
viduals with innovative ideas might be. 
4 Conclusions 
The analysis has shown that two groups of venture capitalists, experienced 
and inexperienced venture capitalists, have to be distinguished when the 
effects of public subsidies on venture capital markets are examined. 
Experienced venture capitalists have already gained experience to make 
high-risk investments profitable, while inexperienced venture capitalists 
have not yet gained sufficient experience to finance high-risk investment in 
a profitable way. 
Experienced venture capitalists reduce their support of the management 
teams under public equity. A reduction in management support decreases 
the total surplus of the enterprises, which is the sum of the expected pay-
offs of the entrepreneur, the government and the venture capitalist. Public 
subsidies cause an individual efficiency loss if venture capitalists are suffi-
ciently experienced. Moreover, if many venture capitalists are sufficiently 
experienced, this individual efficiency loss results in a welfare loss. 
However, inexperienced venture capitalists have incentives to enter the 
market for high-risk investments when the publicly supported co-investor 
offers public equity to venture-capital-backed enterprises. In this way, 
public equity schemes can aid inexperienced venture capitalists in gaining 
technology-specific experience and can thereby support the growth of a 
powerful venture capital industry. 
Positive welfare effects of public equity schemes can be expected only if 
the venture capital market is in its early stage, in which only a relatively 
small number of venture capitalists have gained experience necessary to 
profitably finance young high-technology enterprises. In this stage of a 
venture capital market, public equity can stimulate learning processes. 
However, this is welfare improving only if the venture capitalists’ learning 
process is hampered significantly so that the realized growth rate of experi-
ence is below the efficient rate. – 18 – 
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Appendix: Public equity lowers the surplus of the enterprise 
The change in the surplus of the enterprise under public equity is deter-
mined by the second bracket term in equation [16] which is given by: 
() ( ) ()
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Public equity does not increase the total surplus of the enterprise if the 
right-hand term is smaller than or equal to zero for all parameter combina-
tions fulfilling the following parameter restrictions: 
() 1 , 0 , ∈ β α ,  α ,  , and  .   1 < +β 1 > I [] 1 , 0 , ∈ κ l p
Assume first that κ . Then   is zero for all parameter combinations 
of interest.  
1 = ES f
Assume now a decrease in κ . The effect of this decrease on   is given 
by the partial derivative: 
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If this partial derivative is non-negative for all parameter combinations ful-
filling the restrictions imposed, i.e. if   is monotonic in κ , the second 
bracket term is never larger than zero. Rearranging the terms gives: 
ES f
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. – 20 – 
For the parameter fulfilling the parameter restrictions imposed, the square 
bracket term is never smaller than zero. Therefore, public equity reduces 
the total surplus of the enterprise, because if κ    is zero for all 
parameter combinations and an increase in κ  increases the value of  . 
1 = ES f
ES f– 21 – 
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